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In this essay, the author approaches the question "Does Nature Have Rights ? " from an ecofeminist
perspective, using Aeschyhts' The Eumenides as emJjlematic of reslgnifying woman/nature as non-
subject, and working primarily from Val Plumwood's Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, with ref-
erence to the work of Grosz, Irigary, Lovelock atul others. She considers ontologies of nature as
"intentional," "living" and as a "being" entitled to rights, and weighs the question of revisiting
metaphysics in developing an account of nature that would yield an ethos favorable to the health of
planet Earth. This account refers to what Irigaray has called "another pannisia of the divine."
Does a river have the right not to be pol-
luted? Does the tiger have the right not to
be made extinct? And if so (or not) are these
legal as well as ethical rights? Who decides?
What are the sine qua nons that qualify be-
ings for rights, and does Nature need or have
them? These questions must be asked be-
cause Nature is at an ecological crossroads,
and someday, someone is going to court on
behalf of a lake or a species, or the whole
planet, requiring a redescription of Nature
which could qualify it legally and ethically
to protection from irreparable harm.
I want to consider how to construct such
an ethics by reading Nature and rights through
ecofeminism. In this essay I work most in-
tensely out of Val Plumwood's book, Feministn
and the Mastery of Nature, with reference to
writings by Irigaray, Grozs, Gatens, and oth-
ers. I will also refer to the Gaia Hypothesis as
a re-imagining of Nature useful to this project.
I stipulate that ecofeminism is an ethics, and I
suggest that there is no way to give an account
of Nature or rights without metaphysics.
Descriptions of "Nature" are constructed
not only for issues of survival, but also out of
wonder; and, less laudably, in order "ethi-
cally" to facilitate human agendas of exploi-
tation. Therefore we have ontologies of Na-
ture as divine, subject, inspirited; and we have
ontologies of Nature as dead matter, mind-
less, object, mechanical; as intentional, and
as not; with and without teleology, with and
without self-detemiination. Each of these de-
scriptions serves a human purpose, each
essentializes Nature in such a way as to make
it comprehensible and/or manageable, as if
there were a "something" called Nature. I do
not forget that Nature is not just the matter of
the physical universe, but its movement also,
its "power" and its habit of continual creativ-
ity, evolution. Nature is a system of systems
not fully comprehended, neither in its behav-
iors nor in its—dare I say—nature.
This being said, here are some dictionary
definitions of (a) rights and (b) nature. The
compact edition of the Oxford English Dic-
tionary says the following:
[rights:] That which is consonant with
equity or the light of nature; that
which is morally just or due; The title
or claim to something properly
possessed by one or more persons;
That which justly accrues or falls to
anyone; what one may properly
claim; one's due. In accordance with
justice or righteousness; righteously
in harmony with the moral standard
of actions.
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[nature:] The creative and regulative
physical power which is conceived of
as operating in the material world and
as the immediate cause of all phenom-
ena; more or less definitely personified
as a female being; the or a slate of
nature - a) the moral state natural to
man, as opposed to a state of grace b)
the condition of man before the
foundation of organized society; the
essential qualities or properties of a
thing; the inherent and inseparable
combination of properties essentially
pertaining to anything and giving it its
fundamental character.
The Collins Universal Dictionary gives the
following definition of ''nature";
[nature:
I
the world, the universe, known
and unknown; the power underlying all
phenomena in the material world; the
innate or essential qualities of a thing;
the environment of man.
In instances in which Nature is personified
in contemporary usage, it is always as
female, mother. The ancient Greeks used
the same convention. So, a good place to
begin is where woman and Nature are
^^officially^^ and publicly stripped of
personhood, and rights.
With regard to rights, Nature plays an ethi-
cal role: "that which is consonant with eq-
uity or the light of nature," as though equity
exists "with... the light of nature." So, in a
sense, rights (and ethics) are inherent in Na-
ture itself. And while equity is not quite equal-
ity, or sameness, it is described as a charac-
teristic of Nature. The issue of "difference"
plays a major role in the construction of eth-
ics for ecofeminists, for example, but "differ-
ence" without hierarchy, without domination.'
Can this be called natural equity? Is Nature
the source of ethics? of justice? of rights,
including its own?
While much has been made, in criticism
on ecological issues, of the biblical account
of creation and its God/nature relationship
(and with justification), not enough has been
said of the role of Greek thought in Western
discourse about Na-
ture, and its negative
effect on the rela-
tionship between hu-
man beings and the
rest of the natural
world. Plumwood
identifies "the Greek"
as a wellspring for the
Western ecological
dilemma:
The language in these definitions presup-
poses an anthropocentric, even biblical,
worldview. Yet it presumes also an older layer
of belief in a creative, organizing power in-
herent in Nature itself, recognizing that this
power is always personified as female, and it
is to this older layer that we shall appeal for
re-imagining Nature, as well as to science.
Nature is described here as the "moral state
of man [sicy but it also draws a distinction
between "man" and nature, between the natu-
ral world and the world of God ("as opposed
to a state of grace," for instance; no reading
here of natural grace). Lastly, "the environ-
ment of man" (not other species) positions
Nature as a site of concern to humans, even
though language of ownership is used.
The society of classical Greece is often
viewed benignly, by both liberal and
environmental writers, as the cradle of
western civilization, and the philosophy
of Plato is especially revered as the
source of its proud intellectual, artistic
and civic traditions. [...| [But some
feminists] have seen in the Platonic
account of reason a masculine identity
which has profoundly influenced its
character.'
She points out that many environmental writ-
ers look to the Greeks as "respecting and cel-
ebrating the earth through the worship of
Gaia" ' (and this may have been true on a
"country" level); but as she demonstrates,
even the Gaia story in the hands of Plato is
"designed to promote. . .not environmentalism
but militarism."^ This is because for Plato,
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as for other Greek writers of the classical pe-
riod, the focus of ethics and myth is not Gaia
as Nature, but polls as Nature. So, it is per-
haps with some irony that Gaia is offered by
Lovelock and Margulis as a scientific model
for environmentalism.
I argue that, yes. Nature is a being with
rights that were systematically stripped away
by resignifying Nature, from living being, to
woman, to slave, to mechanism; as object,
non-agentive, non-living, as non-logos.^ Be-
fore the supremacy ofpolls. Nature was imag-
ined and experienced as an intelligent, cre-
ative, giving deity. According to Lovelock,
"The idea that the Earth is alive is probably
as old as humankind."'' Undoubtedly. Even
today, this belief persists, in other cultures:
not only in animist traditions, but also in Hin-
duism, Buddhism, Jainism, Taoism, some of
the "great world religions." How, then, (and
why) in the West did Nature become a slave,
an object, a non-living mechanism without
identity or rights? a "not us"?
According to the dictionary definitions,
in instances in wliich Nature is personified
in contemporary usage, it is always as fe-
male, mother. The ancient Greeks used the
same convention. So, a good place to begin
is where woman and Nature are "officially"
and publicly stripped of personhood, and
rights. I offer as signifier excerpts from the
play. The Eumenldes, by Aeschylus. The
Eumenldes (meaning, more or less, "nice old
ladies") is the third play of a trilogy on the
Trojan War. the Orestela. It marks a point
not only at which female genealogy is sup-
pressed,^ but more significantly for this study,
a point at which "mother" ceases to have
rights—and furthermore, ceases to be. •
This Greek "soap opera" tells the story of
how Orestes, son of Agamemnon, kills his
mother because she killed his father because
he sacrificed their daughter Iphegeneia for a
fair wind to Troy. The ghost of Clytemnestra,
the murdered mother, rouses the Furies, the
ancient retributive ami of the old Earth God-
dess, to bring him to justice. (Notice that jus-
tice was assumed to arise from Earth.) Apollo,
who admits to having incited Orestes to kill
his mother, argues for Orestes in court:
The mother, so-called, is not the child's
begetter, but only nurse of the new-sown
embryo; the one who mounts, the male,
engenders, whereas she, unrelated,
merely preserves the shoot
for one unrelated to her.*
The language used here clearly inscribes woman
as a passive field. Earth, and like the field as
not related to the "shoot" growing in her. As
pioof, he offers the Goddess Athena (born un-
naturally, full-grown from Zeus' forehead):
I
A) father could give birth without a
mother; near to hand
there is one who was not nurtured in a
womb of darkness
but is the kind ot" shoot that no goddess
could give birth lo.''
hi this short speech Aeschylus/Apollo re-
duces woman to body/field/nature and strips
away her rights as mother, indeed, strips away
the word and meaning "mother"—that is, the
source of life, relatedness. By disconnecting
child from mother they/lie disconnect(s) hu-
man from Nature. The Furies are argued out
of supporting mother-right by a soothing
speech from Athena, who is made by Aeschylus
to repudiate her own mother (Metis, swallowed
by Zeus, out of fear of the child she was carry-
ing), and to announce:
[TJhcre is no mother who gave birth to
nic
and I approve the male principle in all
things and with all my heart.'"
Athena casts her vote such that Orestes is
acquitted of matricide, because he had no
mother to murder in the first place. It is not
accidental that Athena is goddess of war and
is identified with polls, not wild "female"
nature. She is herself stripped of her feniale-
ness (and her older, chthonic identity, identi-
fiable by her familiars, the snake and the owl)
to act as poster girl for the glories of patriar-
chy. Polls triuinphs.
The shift in this text from mother-right to
full-blown patriarchy provides a "rational"
ethos for domination—male over female,
Greek over barbarian, master over slave, hu-
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man over Nature. It sets up dualisms that
Plumwood argues are at the heart of the "mas-
ter model," and provide ethical and legal justi-
fications for war, slavery, and cok)nialisms. It
"unpersons" woman and Nature simulta-
neously, and disempowers both, by redefining
their ontologies. It is only a short hop from
the not-us-ness of women to the not-us-ness
of other beings who may be wanted for slave
labor, including the Earth itself. "Mother" and
"Nature" can no longer
legitimately defend
themselves, even if they
still had their rights, be-
cause their retributive
arm. the Furies, has been
neutralized. It is evident
in this account that the
rape and plunder of Na-
ture is no sin, since Na-
ture has no more rights
and is no more a "person" than the human fe-
male is. Not "us." Not eligible for "rights."
(Ironically, this structure mirrors Athenian "de-
mocracy" exactly.)
These few lines by Aeschylus show the
movement from one ethos to another. The re-
jection of the "womb of darkness" is exactly a
distancing of the human from identification
with body and Nature, and from the ethos of
the natural world—^just as the Delphic Oracle's
original source of knowledge and ethics (Gaia)
is replaced by violent inhabitation by Apollo:
he literally murders the old order (Pythoness)
and rides the Oracle like a rapist." Here the
voice of Nature (Gaia) is displaced by an ethos/
deity who anoints himself with the "right" to
speak through violence. Might makes right(s).
Thus, Earth/woman, who was a speaking sub-
ject is silenced, objectified, becoming a ves-
sel through which the male voice passes (wit-
ness the bizarre speech of Athena). By male
gods' appropriating such powers over the fe-
male, "'Mother Nature' is depotentiated, and
her birthgiving powers are taken over by the
male." '-^ And depotentiating Nature rational-
izes (provides a divinely sanctioned ethos for)
the wanton destruction of Nature that many
are even now scrambling to undo. Aeschylus'
unmothering here is heard all the way down
to Freud's strange (or not) belief that the hu-
man (male) is forever trying to repudiate, dis-
tance himself from, and simultaneously appro-
priate the mother (Nature).
Aeschylus' text opens two areas for dis-
cussion: ( 1 ) the sinmltaneous description of
woman and Nature as identical (and as col-
lectively "other"), making way for the con-
struction of the patriarchal ethos as "right,"
"justified," divinely sanctioned; and (2) the
The legacy of estrangementfrom Nature
must be dealt with, a system ofdualisms
inheritedfrom the Greeks and Hebrews
by which human beings exclude each
other, different species, and the planet
itself
revelation that everything from ontologies to
ethics can be (and is) constructed, and as such
can be de- and reconstructed. Most impor-
tant here is the violent (and unnatural) con-
struction of an ethos of patriarchy on the bro-
ken backs and confiscated rights and subjec-
tivity of both women and the natural world.
While Eisler uses the term "dominator model"
to refer to the patriarchal ethos, Plumwood
prefers the term "master model." Either will
do, though Plumwood 's term, "master" is
more evocative in relational terms.
I have stipulated that I read ecofeminism
as an ethics: it argues from a positive ethical
position that gender (and every other) equal-
ity is "right" and naturally right, and that all
forms of inequality and domination are
"wrong." By this yardstick, every exercise
of power-over that disadvantages the domi-
nated is morally wrong. For the dominated
to be disadvantaged, it has to be in such a state
of being as to experience disadvantage—that
is, alive and feeling—and that in order for the
disadvantaging to be justified, the donimated
has first to be reinscribed as an object (woman,
Nature), an "other" that does not inherently
have the same "nature" nor essence of "sub-
ject" as the exerciser of power-over, the domi-
nator, the master.
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I identify planet Earth as the primary lo-
cus of this discussion of Nature, because the
iminediate ethical problem of our relationship
with Nature is with our own planet. Aeschylus
notwithstanding, Earth is indeed our mother:
it gave birth to us in whatever way a planet
gives birth to its biota. This being said, how
is it that we pay scientific lip service to this
verity yet, at the same time, imagine ourselves
ontologically as "other"? Or more properly,
how is it that we imagine the planet as "other"
(than us)? Greek and biblical accounts iden-
tify the source of human life (and that strange
factor, mind) as sky father gods who absurdly
try to give birth or create without matter/
mother being anything beyond instrumental
to the father. In the Greek account. Nature/
woman is stripped of rights. In the biblical
account. Nature has no rights to begin with.
It is the property (like a wife, perhaps) of God.
Both accounts are violent. This is the official
legacy of Western thought.
There is, of course, that unofficial legacy,
what Irigaray calls "a sedimentation laid down
in its time by earlier traditions." '^ She is re-
ferring to older beliefs of the inspiritedness
of the natural world. Irigaray goes so far as
to suggest that the death of the phallic god
heralded by Nietszche is "not about the dis-
appearance of the gods but about the approach
or the annunciation of another parousia of the
divine." '^ An optimistic thought: perhaps this
is Lovelock and Margulis' Gaia. This old
"sedimentation" is the shadow tradition of
Western thinking, appearing as Francis of
Assisi, Hildegarde, Keats, Thoreau, Spinoza,
marginalized thinkers: poets, mystics, and
heretics. Yet this "sedimentation" is a persis-
tent source for the reconstruction of the rights
of Nature.'"^
But now the legacy of estrangement from
Nature must be dealt with, a system of dual-
isms inherited from the Greeks and Hebrews
by which human beings exclude each other,
different species, and the planet itself.
Plumwood describes this system as
"hyperseparation" "'; all of these "others" have
been forcibly inscribed as discontinuous from
each other. Plumwood argues:
[Nature itself] in most of its senses and
contrasts is subject to radical exclusion
and is conceplually constituted by it. as
well as by the other features of dualism.
[...] There is a total break or disconti-
nuity between humans and nature, such
that humans arc completely different
from everything else in nature."
Different and superior, that is, masters of one
or another ontology of Nature that leaves it in
the "slave" category.
Although the relationship (between
master and slave) is usually... presented
as being in the interests of the domi-
nated as well as the dominator, it is
apparent that those on the lower side of
the dualisms are obliged to put aside
their own interests for those of the
master or centre, that they are con-
ceived of as his instruments, as a means
to his ends.'^
That Nature has been "ontologized" as a
means to human ends is not news, nor is it
news that the Western view of Nature does
indeed categorize it as slave. But it is a dis-
obedient slave, like woman; and without ben-
efit of phallic rule, it is characterized as "lack-
ing", just as the Lacanian/Freudian/Aristote-
lian woman is lacking (penis = mind/soul).
Plumwood writes:
That women's inclusion in the sphere of
nature has been a major tool in their
oppression emerges clearly from a
glance at traditional sources: "Woman
is a violent and uncontrolled animal"
(Cato); "A woman is but an animal and
an animal not of the highest order"
(Burke): "I cannot conceive of you to
be human creatures, but a sort of
species hardly a degree above a
monkey" (Swift); |...] "A necessary
object, woman, who is needed to
preserve the species or to provide food
and drink" (Aquinas). '"*
I repeat these quotations as a reminder that
the contiguity of woman and Nature is con-
tinuous throughout patriarchal history. The
disdain for natural and, in particular, animal
life evident in these statements prevents Na-
ture, animal, woman, from entering the sphere
of "us," the ethical, those who deserve rights.
It is little wonder, then, that there is such dif-
ficulty in knowing how to address the rights
of Nature, when the rights of women and other
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"others" (races, species, etc.) have only be-
gun to be addressed.
One approach some feminist writers-"
have taken is to reimagine the term "differ-
ence," (since hierarchies of oppression are
always predicated on difference in phallic
culture) and the term "other." Difference, they
argue, is not a matter of hierarchy but of "na-
ture." Plumwood suggests "a notion of oth-
erness as non-hierarchical cUff'erence. The
resulting concept of relevant otherness avoids
exclusion"-'—the kind of exclusion that
inferiorizes the "other."
[But] recognition of and respect for the
intrinsic value of the other is an
essential adjunct to an ethic of care and
respect for difference... to the extent
that respect is directed to the other for
its own sake, it will not be respect just
for those aspects of the other in which it
resembles us, and hence will entail
respect for difference.
"
She also offers a reading of "other" as inclu-
sive, or rather as "included," but this reading
does not reject difference: she identifies other
species, and individuals of other species, as
"earth others":
We can relate to earth others as
conceived in the intentional stance in
terms of mutual exchange and transfor-
mation, and "the dance of interaction." -^
Her attempt here is to construct a relational
model which recognizes difference without
hierarchy, without speciesism. The term "in-
tentional" which she uses to refer to the "earth
other" is deliberately chosen to propose an
equahty of aliveness of other species, not only
among themselves, but in relation to the hu-
man species.
A view of self as self-in-rclationship
can not only explain how instrunienlal-
ism can be avoided but also provide an
appropriate foundation for an account
of the ecological self, the self in non-
instrumental relationship to nature
[such that the] ecological self can be
viewed as a type of relational self,
which includes the goal of the nourish-
ing of earth others and the earth
community among its own primary
ends, and hence respects or cares for
these others for their own sake.-^
A series of interrelated subjectivities emerges
as part of Pluinwood's account of the natural
world, that "dance of interaction."
Her term "non-instrumentalism" is key to
her development of ethics, and in this text she
wishes to evolve a whole ethics out of a cri-
tique of domination as it affects all designated
"others" in the patriarchal sense: gender, race,
class, species etc. Thus, the model of the
"other" as instrumental (to whoever is the
dominator) must be eliminated. She defines
instrumentalism:
. . .a mode of use which does not respect
the other's independence or fullness of
being, or acknowledge their agency. It
recognises no residue of autonomy in
the instrumenlalised other, and strives
to deny or negate that other as a limit
on the self and as a centre of resis-
tance.-^
The key words are: independence, agency,
autonomy, limit, resistance. These terms,
along with intentionality, are indicators toward
Plumwood 's restructured ontology of the
whole of the natural world, human beings in-
cluded.
[T]he ecological self recognises the
earth other as a centre of agency or
intentionality having its origin and
place like mine in the community of the
earth, but as a different centre of
agency, which limits mine.-*
So, her ethics recognizes common origins
for all, but differences in "agency," and that
"making room" for the "eiu^th other" as equal
means I must recognize and accept limits to
my own agency. This she names "mutual-
ity," which calls for the "recognition of and
respect for the intrinsic value of the
other. . . [as] essential adjunct to an ethic of care
and respect for difference." ^^
And also sameness. Plumwood rather
bravely suggests re-assigning to Nature, and
to "earth others," such "mind" qualities as in-
tentionality, emotion, agency and teleology:
The unfolding, development and
directness inherent in natural processes
also involve a kind of teleology and
intentionality....-**
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Nature as goal-oriented! This comes very
close to a construction of Nature as alive and
thinking, a "subject." For the present pur-
poses, to determine if Nature has rights,
Plumwood offers arguments that lead straight
to the point. She urges that "earth others'" be
seen as "other nations," as some Native cul-
tures do; and such an account of other beings
as "same" with some differences is close to
what Plumwood is looking for.
She builds up the bones of an ethics of
natural rights for all beings, but does not go
so far as to develop fully a "being" for Na-
ture itself; rather, she describes a web, a
relationalism among beings that constitutes
a sort of whole, which we might call Na-
ture. Its nature is collective, and I believe
that she, like many other thinkers, is still not
free of the dualism of the One and the
Many—that is. she has not recognized that
they are not mutually exclusive. For
Plumwood, Nature is as a kind of living, in-
tentional, teleological, self-detennining, and
feeling collective of related beings, having
the earth, and being a part of it. This is a
kind of "whole," though she is very careful
not to homogenize and obliterate individu-
ality and difference.
Feminist thinkers are, of course, not the
only ones to have attempted an account of
Nature that could be eligible for "rights." I
have mentioned the Gaia Hypothesis, which
comes not from philosophy, but from science.
It proposes that the Earth is a living, self-regu-
lating organism. As an originator of the con-
cept, James Lovelock writes, "The idea that
the Earth is alive is at the outer bounds of
scientific credibility." ^^
Nature as goal-oriented! This comes
very close to a construction ofNature
as alive and thinking, a '^subject/^
But this proposal is not new—which is
why it was named Gaia—and not new in sci-
ence, as Lovelock tells it. In 1785, Scottish
scientist James Hutton proposed to the Royal
Society of Edinburgh "that the Earth was a
superorganism and that its proper study should
be physiology."^" A living body, if not one
with a mind, as a superorganism it is at least
in some way organized. Lewin explains:
[A superorganism] can be thought of as
a group of individual organisms whose
collective behaviour leads to group-
level functions that resemble the
behaviour of a single organism."
This theory recognizes co-operation as
being equally important as the competitive
struggle of the individual organism for exist-
ence, and is similar to Gaia. Lovelock is clear
about the ethical implications of Gaia:
In Gaia we are just another species,
neither the owners nor the stewards of
this planet. Our future depends much
more upon a right relationship with
Gaia than with the never-ending drama
of human interest.'-
And what is a "right relationship" with
Gaia? How do one behave toward a goddess?
Eliot Deutsch argues that "natural reverence"
is essential to the development of ethical be-
havior toward the planet, toward Nature:
Without what I am calling "natural
reverence" 1 don't sec how it is possible
for us to do more than work out
temporary, makeshift adjustments in
our actual working relations with our
natural environment.'-'
He argues for a "metaphysical grounding" -^
for the development of "natural reverence," and
I am hard pressed to see how it could be done
otherwise. A shift in metaphysics seems un-
avoidable, and Deutsch suggests borrowing
from Eastern sources. I will not disagree with
this suggestion, but will also not pursue this
avenue here, in the interests of brevity. But on
the important point of meta-
physics, accounts such as
Plumwood 's already present a
nascent metaphysics of Nature
j> on which to build. Callicott
also describes a kind of "rela-
tional" self as vital to a meta-
physics of Ecology.'"^ While much postmodern
criticism wants to do away with metaphysics
(its habit of essentializing, etc.), these schol-
ars seem to assume that metaphysics is a tool,
not an end in itself, one that is mutable, and
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shifting, much hke the movement of natural
energies:
In the "organic" concept of nature
imphed by the New Ecology, as in that
iniphed by the New Physics, energy
seems to be a more fundamental and
primitive reality than material objects.
[...| An individual organism, like an
elementaiy particle is, as it were, a
momentary configuration, a local
perturbation, in an energy tlux or "field"
[so that it I is impossible to conceive of
organisms... apart from the field, the
matrix of which they are modes. ^''
This holistic account of nature squares
with Gaia, with superorganism, and with
Plumwood's community of interdependent
dancing "earth others."" Like Plumwood's
model, it recognizes difference and individu-
ality without privileging them. Callicott also
calls for the abolition of the human ego and
espouses a metaphysics of continuity between
human beings and the rest of the natural world,
emphasizing the interrelatedness of the en-
tirety of Nature at a pre-organic level, pre-
senting a picture of Nature as Matrix, Mother.
And at that fundamental level, questions of
essential difference are obliterated by an ac-
count of differences as "momentary con-
figuration! s]... in an energy flux or 'field.'"
That is, the shift of emphasis is away from
"solid matter" to the behavior of energy. This
model does not directly accord consciousness
to the Matrix, but certainly creativity; and
among Nature's creations are human and other
forms of consciousness, so consciousness can
be said to be a characteristic of Nature. In-
tentionality can be said to be a chiu"acteristic
of consciousness, so it follows that intention-
ality is a characteristic of Nature, as
Plumwood has suggested. By inference, then,
intentional ity can be drawn from the Matrix
model. Whether this Matrix can be said to
possess an intentionality of its own is perhaps
not possible, though Plumwood has argued
for this conclusion regarding Nature, as I have
shown. And if Nature possesses conscious-
ness, feeling, and intentionality (and by ex-
trapolation teleology) can it be called a per-
son? Does it have a subjectivity? And if it is
a subject, is it eligible for rights, and is it eli-
gible for justice if it is being harmed?
The writers cited above would clearly like
to construct a metaphysics of Nature that
would account for the rights Nature gives its
members: the right of all beings not to be
dominated by others, but to live in respectful
relation with each other. Irigmay suggests that
ethics begins in wonder.^** McCance counsels
searching among the marginalized, the ex-
cluded, for sites for the development of eth-
ics.^^ Likewise, Plumwood begins with the
excluded (women, other races, other species)
and opens her ethics to all.
So does Nature have rights? Plumwood's
account of Nature as intentional, agentive, te-
leological, and intersubjective (if not outright
subject) suggests that yes. Nature is being, if
not a being; Lovelock and Margulis argue that
Earth (if not Nature as a whole) is a living
being. Does Earth so-described have rights?
And if so, what rights could it have? What
rights does it need? Will human beings af-
ford respect only to those beings that have
been accorded rights? Historically, "rights"
have descended stepwise from self-privileg-
ing upper-class males, to males of other
classes, to females, to persons of other races,
to animals—and now, finally, to Nature itself,"*"
as each of these marginalized categories is
recategorized: so, "female" is accorded
personhood and gets to vote; "other race" is
recategorized as equally human; "animal" is
recategorized as living being with feelings,
and so on. In each case, the "nature" of the
"being" is redefined. If Nature can be de-
scribed as a being, it should be eligible for
legal rights, somewhere along the line. But if
it is a "god" (Gaia), does it need rights?
Because accounts of Nature (including sci-
entific accounts) are so diverse, and because
metaphysics is out of fashion (not to mention
a little bit dangerous), it is very difficult to
call for the rights of a Nature that is a "being-
in-itself ' that would "qualify" for rights. Yet
one wants to. One wants to apply justice to
the despoilers of the planet, to be Nature's ad-
vocate in court. Something almost instinc-
tual says that trashing Nature is unethical, as
even Aeschylus surely knew that abolishing
mother-right was wrong: it had to be done
violently, and by arguing a rationalized, false
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biology (women are not related to their chil-
dren), and a revised metaphysics of Nature
that characterized it as instrument, rather than
as agentive being.
Oppressed groups have given an account
of what it is like to be oppressed. It is these
accounts of oppression that are altering atti-
tudes and behavior toward other human beings
and toward animals. How does Nature as a
whole give an account of the effects of human
exploitation? If we understand the Earth as a
superorganism, can we deduce its suffering, as
we would deduce suffering from, say, a flat-
worm? a colony of bees? What methods can
we use to "hear" the voice of the Being, Na-
ture? The "evidence of Nature" is invariably
always already mediated by human discourses,
be they economic, scientific, or theological.
While ecological devastation is by no
means confined to the West, it has, as Deutsch
has suggested, its metaphysical and ethical
origins in the West. These origins are in-
scribed In and by the dualisms and "otherings"
of Western patriarchal myths, theologies, phi-
losophies, sciences, and agendas of greed,
conquest, and colonization. These agendas
have constructed ontologies of the natural
world that justify the instrumentalization of
Nature, along with all designated "others."
Other cultures offer models of the natural
world suitable to the development of environ-
mental ethics, but the West is distanced by
time from its own such models. However, it
does possess the discursive tools needed to
revisit and revise them in order to undo the
collective internalization of what I call faulty
values, and to prevent further export and ex-
ercise of these "values."^'
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41. Either that, or Gaia will bring back the
Furies Herself. And they will not be nice old
ladies.
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